Abstract

　　Turkey has pursued a policy of divestiture over the past four decades. Yet, it seems that the scholarly research has largely neglected a full account of the recent divestitures. To fill the gap in the literature, this article employs a Marxian analytical framework to explain divestitures in Turkey in the 2010s. The article argues that the most recent era for divestiture is significantly different from the previous ones in terms of its scope, economic and political implications, and the capital groups benefiting from divestitures. First, divestitures had become narrower and more limited in terms of sectoral scope. Second, they had been geared towards earning revenues for the state and creating new financial resources to address the immediate needs of construction-oriented capital accumulation, instead of enhancing export competitiveness. Third, they had been dominated by Islamic-influenced Anatolian companies that have close relations with the AKP government. This interpretation demonstrates that “short-termism” and “favouritism/particularism” have become more important objectives than enhancing “competitiveness” and “transparency” in the recent conjuncture of Turkish political economy. Yet, unlike most of the existing literature, this does not prevent one from interpreting divestiture as a class-based policy that accelerates capital accumulation and systematically privileges the interests of “capital in general.”

　　From: World Review of Political Economy 2023 14 (4)

　　Editor: Wang Yi