Ray Kiely

Abstract

Long before Trump, paleoconservatives like Pat Buchanan were calling for an end to all immigration, removal of ‘illegal’ immigrants, the closure of military bases overseas, massive cuts to government spending, the introducing economic protectionism, and the need to wage a conservative counterattack in the culture wars. It is precisely here that we can see some of the tensions between (and within) paleoconservative and neoliberal ideals, and the reality of the US (and indeed global) political economy. In one respect, Trump represents a re-politicization of the world in the face of the technocratic de-politicization of actually existing neoliberalism since the 1980s. This also feeds into the populist discourse in which technocratic economism has existed alongside competition, so that the losers in this competitive game – individuals, localities, even countries – are somehow less worthy precisely because they have lost. Seen in this way, there is indeed a populist backlash, but one in which recourse to notions of the white working class oversimplifies.

But if Trump represents a re-politicizing response to neoliberal depoliticization, then does his presidency represent a break with neoliberalism? A clear, black-and-white answer cannot be provided because neoliberalism is itself ambiguous. As we have seen, while neoliberalism carries the promise of spontaneity, freedom, and the market, it continually relies on constructing markets, and the state is central to carrying out this project. Even the project of marketization always relies on something outside of the market, such as the sovereign state. While technocratic neoliberalism has been dominant in recent years, neoliberalism can also involve de-politicization through authoritarian rule. There are some parallels here with the radical conservatives of 1930s Germany, as Trump can be seen as an attempt to reenchant a world of bureaucratic rationalisation (albeit this time one where the rationalization has occurred through the market). Ordoliberalism emerged in the 1930s as an authoritarian liberal response to Weimar and an alternative to the Nazis. A number of ordoliberals shared views close to Schmitt’s case for the sovereign to exercise exceptional power in response to the politicization of the economy.

From: Socialist Register 2019, vol. 55

Editor: Wang Yi